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The fiction of terra nullius1 is addressed in Mabo & Ors v The State of Queensland (No 2)(Mabo) 
(1992) 175 CLR 1, however the increasing commodification of water has raised the issue of 
whether a new form of indigenous dispossession is now subtly occurring. When the Crown 
abrogates its beneficial title in favour of private parties through Crown grants, it is now a legal 
maxim that any underlying Indigenous property rights are extinguished or at least diminished to the 
extent of the grant. 
 
Since 2000, the granting of exclusive rights of access to water in the various States’ water 
legislation, has arguably also extinguished or at least diminished surviving Indigenous water 
property rights. Scant research into this impact suggests that the uncrystallised quantum of 
compensation that may be attributable as a result of the granting of such private access rights has 
been deftly underestimated by policy makers. 
 
                                                 
1 empty land or no man’s land 




The creation of private property rights in water arguably impacts upon any pre-existing rights, 
notably Indigenous property rights and interests in water arising from the survival of native title. 
This issue has been given scant attention by legislators, and it is pertinent that acknowledgement of 
native title in the various States' legislation is usually a perfunctory reference to the existence of 
native title, but nothing more. For example, in the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) it is blandly 
stated at s.55(1) that: 
  
A native titleholder is entitled, without the need for an access licence, water supply work 
approval, or water use approval, to take and use water in the exercise of native title rights. 
  
Further, at s.55(2) it is stated that: 
  
This section does not authorise a native title holder: 
(a) to construct a dam or water bore without a water supply work approval, or 
(b) to construct or use a water supply work otherwise than on land that he or she owns. 
  
Furthermore, at s.55(3) in an extraordinary statement, this sub section limits the amount of water for 
"domestic and traditional purposes" that a native title holder can take annually in the following 
manner: 
  
The maximum amount of water that can be taken or used by a native title holder in any one 
year for domestic and traditional purposes is the amount prescribed by the regulations. 
  
The constraints placed upon native title holders in s.55 (3) Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) are 
somewhat surprising, given the likely impact of such constraints on  the uncrystallized obligation 
for compensation which is to be paid by the States arising from abrogation if native title has 
survived. It is however recognised that the extent to which native title is diminished or extinguished 
by current non-tidal water management regimes such as the Water Act 2000 (Qld) and the Water 
Management Act 2000 (NSW) is yet to be clarified, and may or may not be significant depending 
on the circumstances.   
 
If it is accepted that native title in water may have survived to varying degrees throughout Australia, 
then it would appear only prudent for an understanding to be sought as to the nature of these 
Indigenous rights and interests for the possible settlement of native title claims. If, for example 
Indigenous rights and interests can be recognised and incorporated into existing water management 
regimes, this expression of respect and recognition could beneficially impact upon subsequent 
assessments of compensation. Such course of action would seem prudent, rather than allow for an 
unknown and currently incalculable liability for compensation to accrue. 
 
Indigenous water management regimes are increasingly recognised as providing  non Indigenous 
managers with the prospect of “a level of understanding of sustainability and carrying capacity 
which has yet to be experienced.”2 Indeed it was recently noted that in Papua New Guinea and 
Indonesia, such traditional management is arguably more effective than government or non 
government efforts: 
 
                                                 
2 Sheehan, J., (2001) “Indigenous property rights and river management” Water Science and Technology 43 (9), 241. 
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[t]raditional communities protect coral reefs better than governments or conservation 
groups do. A survey by Australian scientists of protected reef areas throughout Papua New 
Guinea and Indonesia has found that traditionally managed corals support larger fish than 
unprotected reefs, whereas most national marine parks or privately funded reserves do not.3 
 
In an endeavour to gain some recognition of Indigenous rights and interests in water, the NSW 
Aboriginal Land Council (NSW ALC) has negotiated with the Department of Land and Water 
Conservation (now the Department of Natural Resources) with a view to obtaining funding for a 
proposed Aboriginal Water Trust. In November 2002, the NSW ALC reported that: 
 
[t]he Aboriginal Water Trust is one method to ensure that people and communities will have 
access to a small pool of funds over two years to help improve their water usage and 
efficiency. The Trust has not yet been established, but are looking at a Dec-Jan timeframe. 
 
The Aboriginal Water Trust is based on funds from consolidated revenue and the DLWC. It 
is important that any gains made by Aboriginal people and communities does not come at 
the direct expense of other stakeholders, such as irrigators and farmers, and thus the monies 
are part of a general budget, rather than levies and indirect taxes.4 
 
In 2001 $5 million5 was allocated by the NSW Government for the Aboriginal Water Trust, 
however in response to a question in the NSW Legislative Council on 2 March 2006, the Hon. Ian 
MacDonald MP, Minister for Natural Resources stated that the funds in the Trust had already been 
allocated. In addition the Minister advised that discussions were being held with “the local 
communities” about the Trust, and indicated that he would provide “the full details” at a later date.6 
 
The continuing reluctance of State Governments to recognise in a meaningful manner Indigenous 
rights and interests in water, does little to allay concerns regarding the uncrystallised obligation for 
compensation. Cavalier thinking is not an exercise which 21st century settler societies such as 
Australia appear to greatly admire, however pervasive prejudices and preconceptions about the 
nature and value of native title clearly requires a robust rethinking of existing water management 
regimes. There is hypocrisy in disregarding native title, and in those who regard native title as a 
distraction in the task of creating a market for newly commodified natural resources such as water. 
The respect that native title demands is necessary and equitable, irrespective of whether it may be 
tedious for those embarking upon market creation. 
  
Hence, the title of this paper Aqua Nullius has been chosen as a counterfoil to terra nullius, which 
by analogy suggests that water is currently viewed as “no mans water”, and that Indigenous rights 
and interests in water can be disregarded.  
 
The following section of this paper canvasses the issue of the Crown’s radical title, and how it 
expands to absolute ownership when native title is extinguished or surrendered.  An alternate 
approach such as common property or res communes is also canvassed in the context of Indigenous 
property rights in water especially beyond the territorial limits of settler law. 
 
 
                                                 
3 New Scientist (2006) No 2562, “Local know best”, (29 July) 5. 
4 NSW Aboriginal Land Council (2002) Partnership Agreement Report for the Human Rights & Equal Opportunity 
Commission Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner Bill Jonas (Sydney: Strategic Policy and 
Planning Unit, NSW ALC), November, p. 3. 
5 NSW Legislative Council, 2 March 2006, Hansard. Question from Ian Cohen MP to the Hon Ian MacDonald on 
“Aboriginal Water Trust”. 
6 NSW Legislative Council, 2 March 2006, Hansard. Reply from the Hon Ian MacDonald to Question from Ian Cohen 
MP on “Aboriginal Water Trust”. 
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RADICAL TITLE AND WATER 
 
The sovereignty of the state over the land within its domain is usually the beginning of civil order. 
Wars are fought to extend political control over land; they are spatially aligned and the resulting 
legal system has been poetically referred to as the laws of the land. Law and space are connected in 
human experience so intimately that it is difficult to recognise the depth of their connection or to 
disconnect them effectively. One of the challenges of the recognition of indigenous ownership is the 
way that it forces the dominant political system in a country to recognise that its laws may not 
extend to its land. Even more uncomfortable is the prospect that the occupying political system may 
have no land tenure at all. This is the issue that Australia and some other western countries, has had 
to grapple with in recent times. 
 
The foundations of property have been extensively dealt with in recent times from general 
treatments of western thought on property, such as Reeve (1986), to specific enquiries into the 
nature of indigenous ownership in Small and Sheehan (2005). Reeve’s summary of Western thought 
on property appears to be consistently grounded in Adam Smith’s conclusion that property is 
simply that situation of possession that is supported by state sanction. This position assumes a state 
that has the authority to sanction the possession of property. However, recognition of indigenous 
ownership goes to the very heart of this legal assumption. It means that the state, through the 
legislature and the judiciary, has a primary obligation to provide justice between citizens, 
circumscribed within the more nebulous expectation of realising the common good. Within this 
primary obligation, the creation of property rights institutions follows as a consequential set of 
conventions that orders the relationships between persons following some notion of justice and the 
common good. However, where some citizens have genuine ownership of land that exists outside of 
the boundaries of the state’s authority, this same primary obligation places an onus on the state to 
defend that ownership right. This legal principle is seen in the case of respecting the conventional 
rights of immigrants that were awarded by foreign authorities, say for example with respect to 
marriage and foreign proprety. It is now the case with indigenous ownership. 
 
Small (2003) articulated the manner in which law was grounded in culture, and ultimately in 
metaphysics. Legal scholarship in this area, such as Hepburn (2005) implicitly asserts a similar 
position by accepting indigenous ownership, while simultaneously questioning the feudal 
conception of Australian property. The legal literature however tends to rely on premises from 
within its own domain, which is proving to be a weakness. Hepburn noted that Anglo-Australian 
property is based on a feudal convention that accepts all property as ultimately residing with the 
monarch, who then distributes it to citizens under various conditions. Her point is that this is 
conceptually problematic, and that allodial property created by the state would be a tidier and more 
defensible basis for the current circumstances. This turns on the question of whether the state (in the 
person of the crown) does own all property at the outset, or whether it merely creates conventional 
property rights as needs develop. The latter is better conformed to the facts, and that there is little 
basis for the claim of crown possession, while recognising that the state does have a central role in 
the recognition of property rights and their management. Using the allodial model, property rights 
are the result of the state’s valid right to create differential privileges between citizens, as seems to 
be the case in the history of water property, but it implies a radical change in the very fundamentals 
of Australian property. Much turns on whether the state can claim to be fundamental owner of 
property. 
 
Several possibilities exist in legal thought for the establishment of property. In the case of conquest, 
it is held that the new sovereign becomes the owner of all land. This fits with European history and 
practice, especially through the feudal era. Notionally, this approach may describe the positive 
circumstances and political realities, but it is proving problematic. Conflicts in various parts of the 
globe witness the reluctance of people to accept the outcomes of conquest and the ensuing struggles 
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that erupt to correct what are perceived as past wrongs. The tensions in Ireland reflect difficulties 
with acquisition by conquest, even centuries ago, and various parts of the Middle East, especially 
the Palestinian struggle to regain their land, are but some of the current instances. Australia has 
never been considered to have been won by conquest, though the Australian Law Reform 
Commission considered the proposition seriously (Hepburn 2005). 
 
Beyond conquest, European history relies on Feudal systems of tenure, though these tend to be 
based on developments of the allodial ownership that preceded it, largely from the late Roman era 
(Stein 1999). Feudal ownership was originally a complex matrix of rights and obligations that are 
better understood as set of cultural mores than a legal structure, though today it is more common to 
examine only its legal aspects (Belloc 1920). Samantha Hepburn (2005) argued convincingly that 
the feudal basis for Anglo-Australian land tenure does not have the necessary historical antecedents 
and should therefore be abolished in favour of an allodial system, similar to the USA. While this 
may have certain practical benefits, especially considering the state of the feudal theory of 
Australian property law, it opens the question of why any particular claim of allodial ownership 
should be recognised in the first place. Nicolette Rogers (1995) asked this question of post-Mabo 
Australia and came to the conclusion that there was indeed little rational ground for the Australian 
government’s claim of radical title over the lands of Australia. On one hand, recognition of limited 
instances of customary ownership, conveniently quarantined to lands that are not the freehold 
possession of white Australia, was perhaps all that was political possible at the time. On the other 
hand, once the notion of all land in Australia belonging to the Crown was challenged, the 
foundation of Australia’s land title system was left without support. 
 
Rogers explored the notion of radical title that has been put forward as the route by which land 
passes from indigenous owners to the Crown, effectively from the jurisdiction of one legal system 
into another. Rogers and Hepburn agree that it has no precedent and exists more as a convenient 
legal fiction than a defensible principle in law. More urgent than obscure enquiries into legal theory 
is the political reality that White Australia was established because it wanted access to the lands of 
Australia, it had the technology to exploit it more effectively than its indigenous population and the 
military superiority to displace the native inhabitants where ever conflict arose. White settlement 
has raised the efficiency of Australian land use, enabled the support of an incomparably larger 
population and consequently multiplied the value of Australian land property. Even if indigenous 
ownership were fully recognised, the contribution of western culture in raising land values could 
give rise to a just claim from western occupants for compensation for the massive increase in values 
that their effort, infrastructure, technology, and even urban populations have created (Small 1998). 
The value of water property is but one part of this set of property rights that constitutes Australia’s 
land resources, and the grounding of its title system is tied up with these questions. 
 
Behind the question of the legal grounding of property rights lies the grounding of the law itself. 
Australia is faced with the recognition and resolution of two competing legal systems: those of the 
indigenous inhabitants and that of the Anglo-Australian tradition. On what basis could one be 
considered superior to the other? Legal scholars are not particularly strong on this question, because 
it operates outside of the scope of legal thought, strictly considered. Small (2003) argued that a 
culture’s legal system was grounded on its dominant ethical system, however this does not resolve 
particular questions pertinent to the legal recognition of water property. Three questions need 
attention, they are the question of where laws come from, this rests partly on the question of the 
relationship between law and ethics and finally, if law is related to ethics, on the nature of ethics 
itself. These questions will be dealt with in reverse order.  
 
There are many systems of ethics and many ways of classifying them. For the purpose of 
understanding the intersection of indigenous and modern cultures, the most important distinction 
relates to the origin and fixity of ethical systems. Ethical systems can either be considered to be a 
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human artefact that is crafted to suit a particular situation, or an external entity that exists 
independently of human action and is progressively discovered through reason. Aristotle’s virtue 
ethics is representative of the position that ethics has an existence that is outside of the moral actor, 
who is obliged to use reason to discover them. Plato also held a conception of ethics that made them 
something that had an existence outside of the moral actors to be discovered through reason The 
alternative, are systems of ethics that claim that ethics are no more than social, or personal, 
constructs and as such, will change with changes in the society or individual. In one way or another, 
modernity is characterised by the latter approach which sees ethics as relative to the individual or 
society and time. For modern people, ethics are fluid and the result of personal decision.  
 
By contrast, indigenous people tend to view ethics as a received body of instruction for action that 
is either accepted or rejected. In most cases indigenous people link their ethics and culture to 
creation myths and often to instruction received from supernatural creative beings. If the myths are 
accepted, then the ethics they provide must follow unchanged. They do not change with situation or 
time, and have many characteristics that make them more like those of Aristotle, and certainly 
Plato. Plato in particular held a view that ethics originated from what he referred to as the realm of 
the forms. This realm is inhabited by pure concepts, not material, empirical beings. It contains the 
designs of all that can exist and their relationships. Considered at this level, ethics is the study of 
appropriate relationships between persons and can be built on the initial understanding of what the 
human person is. When indigenous people attempt to dialogue with western people regarding 
ethical issues, one of the difficulties is that western people tend to be more relativistic in their 
ethical outlook, which creates a fundamental difficulty for inter-cultural communication. Plato is 
part of the western tradition that has the capacity to bridge this gap. In Plato’s work, The Republic, 
he pits Socrates against Thrashymarchus in a debate over the nature of justice. Socrates outlines the 
Platonic/Aristotelian view, while Thrashymarchus could well have been educated in the post-
Enlightment west with his view that justice is the will of the stronger party. The history of the 
interaction between western and indigenous people would empirically confirm Thrashymarchus, 
while the recognition of indigenous ownership suggests that in the fullness of time, justice will 
follow Plato & Socrates. 
 
The link between ethics and law is the second question critical to understanding the quality of a 
legal system. The basic question is priority: does what is right determine what should be legal, or 
does what is legal determine what is right? A little reflection reveals that the former appears 
obviously true, but it is challenged by the implications of ethics being only the personal 
determination of the moral actor. If there is no ethics outside of the decisions of the person, then 
what is legal becomes an important contribution to a person’s personal ethics, and therefore 
determines what is right. This is a weak argument and even if relativistic ethics are accepted, the 
law can be seen to be a product of the collective ethical thought of the majority in a democracy. 
That is, the dominant moral view of the community becomes law through the process of democratic 
government. One way or another, what is right determines what is legal.  
 
Some exceptions exist, and these are important when considering the origin of particular property 
rights. Driving on the left hand side of the road in Australia is legal, though it would be foolish to 
say it is derived from some notion of morality. It is simply an arbitrary convention adopted for the 
more efficient organisation of society. Every society has many laws that are purely conventional. 
These are sometimes referred to as positive laws, because they are merely posited, not adopted from 
some ethical deliberation. The force of positive laws lies not on their moral claim on compliance, 
but on the state’s right to punish offenders sufficiently to discourage non-compliance. For this 
reason they are correctly referred to as positive penal laws, as contrasted to purely moral laws that 
derive their force from the moral consensus of the community. This arrangement is shown 
schematically in Exhibit 1: 
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The third question relates to the origin of the laws. Over the last century or two, debate in the 
theory, or philosophy, of law has concentrated on the question of whether law is somehow a fixed 
code that is discovered, or a fluid response to the needs of a particular society and time. The former 
position is known as natural law theory and traces its origins to Plato, with his theory of the forms, 
found in his writings such as the Republic. His dialogue known as the Crito is short and focused on 
respect for law. Taken together, Plato painted an image of the laws as something bigger than the 
individual, eternal, stable and deserving the respect of all people, even when they appear harsh.  
 
The alternative theory, known as positive law theory is closely tied with modernity. This theory 
focuses on the existence of positive penal laws as an obvious example of valid laws that have no 
moral content, despite being useful for the ordering of a civilised society. It then extends the scope 
of positive law to include all laws, thereby freeing the law from its linkage to moral thought. The 
position is closely related to modern ethical thought, especially if one believes that there is no moral 
code outside of the personal moral calculus of the individual. The modern era has been dominated 
by the notion of the superiority of the individual, begun by John Wycliffe (d.1384), accelerated by 
Niccolao Machiavelli (d.1527) and systematised in the eighteenth century by the Enlightenment 
philosophers. In legal theory, William Blackstone (1769) Commentaries on the Laws of England 
reflected the modern inclination, while Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1814) established the German 
historical school on the premise that law was not a construct of reason but convention that 
responded to the society’s needs of a time. 
 
Positive law theory enjoyed rising support over the past half millennium, but the last half century 
has witnessed a return in interest in natural law theory. This may have been the result of a number 
of influences, including the explicit investigation of the implications of a strong positive law theory, 
but it seems that the history of the twentieth century itself has provided some powerful data on the 
integrity of the positive law position. When H.L.A. Hart (1977) set out to argue positivism and the 
separation of law and morals he was forced to use instances drawn from the experience of Nazi 
Germany as the most powerful instance of the separation of law and moral that the west has 
witnessed. Lloyd Weinreb (1987) noted that Hitler’s Germany has become the test case for positive 
law theory, and one that powerfully points out its shortcomings. Lord Devlin (1977) observed that 
contemporary English law eventually reduces to the moral position of the average “man on the 
Clapham bus” suggesting that while a democracy will enact any law it chooses, the mandate to 
make law is ultimately grounded on the beliefs of the majority in the community, and those beliefs 
are moral, one way or another. Stephen Guest analysed Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law and 
concluded that his “… theory of law is that the nature of legal argument lies in the best moral 
interpretation of existing social practices” (Guest 1997). This position is not quite natural law 
theory because it admits a vagueness in moral deliberation that natural law theorists would reject, 
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sever. Charles Rice (1999) is representative of a growing number of legal theorists who accept 
Dworkins basic recognition, but then take it forward to demonstrate the logical consistency of a 
moral system based on a disinterested enquiry into Aristotelian natures leading to perennial 
principles to judge any legal system. It is only using external criteria such as these that the relative 
quality and merit of competing legal systems can be gauged. It is also useful in the case of 
indigenous legal systems since it admits an inquiry into the metaphysical premises as well. 
 
The debate in the western theory of law is vitally important for the question of indigenous 
ownership. Indigenous ownership is best understood within the framework of natural law theory. 
This means that while the balance of western legal thought is dominated by the positive law 
paradigm, it cannot fully appreciate the mechanics of indigenous ownership. The Australian Native 
Title Act is an instance of positive law attempting to solve a pragmatic legal problem without 
engaging the underlying philosophical problem. It is very likely that the eruption of native 
ownership issues in this part of history is timely, as it comes at a point when the west is revisiting 
the very basis of its legal theory. Native ownership may be more evidence that the positive 
institution of property, as articulated by such as Lord Blackstone, is defective for the very reason 
that it rests on a defective understanding of law and morality. This is the point partly made by 
Hepburn (2005). 
 





Indigenous people, Socrates/Plato/Aristotle 




Ethics exists outside of the human person, 
fixed, received, uncovered 
 
Ethics is a human construct that is subject 
to the community, times and personal 




Law comes from ethics or operates within it. Law and ethics are independent. 
Foundations of 
Law 
Natural Law: Law follows from deductions 
drawn from understanding of natures. 
Positive Law: Laws are merely positive 
conventions that must be obeyed under 
threat of sanction. 
 
Hepburn’s argument is methodologically moral, it argues for the best outcome for the community in 
the design of the legal framework of property. It recognises that radical title, the nascent title that 
Anglo-Australian law awards the state when indigenous ownership is extinguished, is a meaningless 
title whose only usefulness is to provide a channel for property to move into western dominion. 
Conversely, the Australian government is generally acknowledged to have the right to regulate the 
use of natural resources for the benefit of the country. Note that this right to regulate is a moral 
argument grounded on a Dworkin-like recognition that law should serve the dominant moral 
position of the society. The right to regulate necessarily creates property rights, which, as privileges, 
have commercial value. Ownership of these property rights does not necessarily mean ownership of 
the things that the rights refer to, only the ownership of the benefits of use, which the regulation 
permits. Reeve (1986) pointed out that this is consistent with the understanding of property that has 
dominated western thought for some centuries, though it tends to be ignored in the popular view. 
 
This means that in general, western property is not ownership at all, but merely possession of use 
rights supported by state sanction. If the state is the ultimate owner of all property rights, as under 
the feudal model, then private allocation of property rights can be ownership by transfer, but 
Hepburn and Rogers have argued that this is not the case in Australia. Obviously, the existence of a 
genuine owner undermines this whole structure, since ownership suggests a priority of rights that 
makes state regulation of secondary importance only.  
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If the indigenous inhabitants of Australia are genuine owners of the continent, then they are owners 
of the water resources of the continent as well, even if some aspects of that ownership were not 
explicitly articulated in their customs. While the state has the right to regulate the use of water 
resources, the property rights that follow from that regulation will necessarily belong to the owners, 
if they exist. There will possibly be other regulatory rights that the owners will have qua owners, 
even if third parties hold the use rights. These would be analogous to the rights of a land owner over 
the activities of a tenant to limit the activities of the tenant beyond what is permitted by the state. 
 

















Exhibit 3 (above) schematically outlines the relationships between the parties involved in the 
ownership and use of water property. If the indigenous peoples claim ownership to water, which 
could be consistent with their customs and mythology, then they own the resource regardless of 
Anglo-Australian law. Anglo-Australian law does have the right to regulate the use of water 
resources, but this right is a right of license or veto to use, not to own. In this way, the western user 
of water may own the right to water as an allodial property right, but they do not own the water 
itself as the latter is owned by the indigenous customary owners. Despite not owning the water, the 
use of the water is a valuable privilege which now can be traded. What is yet to be determined is to 
what degree and to what value is the level of indigenous ownership. It is may be the case that the 
license to use water may be validly awarded by the state, but the rent from its use may belong, in 
some way and to some extent, to the indigenous owners. 
 
The next section will explore the extent to which recognition of indigenous ownership of water 
rights have been recognised by Australian law. If it is a fact that instances of indigenous ownership 
has been recognised in particular cases, then it follows that it was the general case. The logic of the 
Mabo decision was that when the state used its licit right to create property rights, they extinguished 
indigenous property rights by double effect. There appears to be evidence that acceptance is rising 
for the opinion that this did not extinguish ownership, even though it extinguished property rights. 
The challenge for the present is to examine to what extent indigenous people understood ownership 
of water resources, and how the rights that follow from the use of these resources should be 
allocated in the light of this ownership. 
 
 
Indigenous ownership of the 
Australian continent, including 
water. 
Anglo-Australian law’s right to 
regulate use of natural resources 
for the common good. 
Water property user holding a 
Water Property License. 
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PARLOUS PROSPECTS FOR COMPENSATION  
 
The issue of compulsory acquisition of water access rights under legislation such as  the Water 
Management Act 2000 (NSW), has raised the vexed question of compensation for these statutory 
rights which are personalty and not realty, with one exception in the NSW legislation. The manner 
in which non Indigenous rights to water are being dealt with provides important guideposts for 
Indigenous property rights in water. 
 
Entitlement to compensation for the cancellation of water access is widely regarded as problematic, 
and unsurprisingly the Water Management Amendment (Water Property Rights Compensation) Bill 
2006 (NSW) was tabled in the Legislative Assembly on 6 April, 2006, as a private members bill.  It 
proposes the inclusion of access licences as a defined interest under s.4 Land Acquisition (Just 
Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW). 
 
An earlier somewhat similar proposal amending the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) was 
suggested by the NSW Division of the Australian Property Institute in 2002, on the basis that: 
 
…the current Act displays a continuing lack of clarity in relation to the existing, s. 79 
Compulsory acquisition of access licences, and[the Institute] proposes that amendments 
should be made to this part of the Act. 
 
It is the Institute’s view that the Act is quite limited in how compensation is to be 
determined, and it is considered that the relevant sections namely s.79 and s.87 should be 
amended to refer to the provisions of the Land Acquisition  (Just Terms Compensation) Act 
1991 (NSW). This is a procedure which has been adopted in other legislation, and is 
regarded by the Institute as an overdue amendment to this Act, and would maintain 
conformity with other legislation. 
   
It was also noted that the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 does not 
include access licences as a registered interest in the definitions in s.4.  The Institute 
considers that inclusion of access licence as a registered interest, could easily achieve this 
recognition, given that usefully access licence is already defined pursuant to s.4 in the 
Water Management Act 2000 (viz. s.56). 7 
 
The 2002 proposal by the Institute was never adopted by the NSW Government, and it is interesting 
that the Water Management Amendment (Water Property Rights Compensation) Bill 2006 (NSW) 
picks up the flavour of the original proposed amendments. There has been a unwillingness to amend 
the limited compensation provisions of the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), and this suggests 
that the current Government will not support the 2006 Bill. 
 
However, access to water is not wholly confined to licences under the Water Management Act 2000 
(NSW), and s.52 states as regards existing riparian rights, described as “domestic and stock rights” 
that: 
 
(1) An owner or occupier of a landholding is entitled, without the need for an access 
licence, water supply work approval or water use approval:  
(a) to take water from any river, estuary or lake to which the land has frontage or 
from any aquifer underlying the land, and 
(b) to construct and use a water supply work for that purpose, and 
                                                 
7 Letter from John Sheehan, [then] President, NSW Division, Australian Property Institute to Ms Dominique Tubier, 
Senior Policy Advisor Legislation,  Minister for Fair Trading and Land & Water Conservation, 28 November 2002. 
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(c) to use the water so taken for domestic consumption and stock watering, but not 
for any other purpose. 
 
Further, at s.52 (3) “domestic consumption” and “stock watering” are defined as: 
 
Domestic consumption, in relation to land, means consumption for normal household 
purposes in domestic premises situated on the land. 
 
Stock watering, in relation to land, means the watering of stock being raised on the land, but 
does not include the use of water in connection with intensive animal husbandry. 
 
Clearly, s.52 riparian rights demonstrate a connection with land, which is a compensable interest 
under the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW). In this Act, an interest in 
land means not only a legal or equitable estate, but also an interest which is "in connection with the 
land", and hence captures s.52 rights to water. It is not surprising that such rights evidence 
connectivity with land given that this riparian doctrine can only be overturned if Government: 
 
…commit[s] the common law heresy of granting property in water.8 
  
There are other sections of the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) which permit the Minister to 
revoke or cancel the access licence, and it is well recognised that as personal property the State of 
NSW could decide to acquire such licences  without compensation. Whilst s.79  provides for 
the compulsory acquisition of access licences however,  s.79(2) states that a holder is: 
 
…entitled to compensation for the market value of the licence as at the time it was 
compulsorily acquired. 
 
This is not compensation as envisaged in the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 
(NSW), which takes into account not just the market value of an interest in land, but a whole raft of 
heads of compensation. Such matters arguably enable a package of compensation to be calculated 
which fully compensates the dispossessed owner for the loss arising from the compulsory 
acquisition. 
  
Notwithstanding the provisions in s.79(2), the State of NSW has no constitutional obligation9 to pay 
compensation for the compulsory acquisition of realty, whereas the Commonwealth has an 
obligation to pay just terms compensation pursuant to s.51 (xxxi) of the Australian Constitution. 
Furthermore, valid compulsory acquisition by the Commonwealth is subject to fulfilling the 
compensation provision, whereas NSW is not similarly limited by its constitution.10  
 
Raff observes that it would be “politically unacceptable”11 for a State to confiscate private property, 
and not unexpectedly the various states have enacted legislation to provide for a right to 
compensation, albeit limited. In addition, NSW has in the past avoided or further reduced 
compensation through specific amending legislation, for example  s.18 City and Suburban Electric 
Railways Act, 1915 - 1967 (NSW) amends s.124 Public Works Act 1912 (NSW) to limit the 
compensation to be paid for land acquired for the route of the Eastern Suburbs Railway to its value 
 at 27 February 1967. 
                                                 
8 Clark, S & Renard, I. (1970)  Riparian Doctrine and Australian Legislation. 7 MULR 475 at 489. 
9 Standing Committee on Law and Justice (2001) A NSW Bill of Rights Report 17 (Sydney: Legislative Council, 
October), 11. 
10 New South Wales v Commonwealth  (Wheat Case) (1915) 20 CLR 54, per Griffith CJ at 66 and per Barton J at 77. 
11 Raff, MJ (2002) “Planning Law ad Compulsory Acquisition in Australia” in T. Kotaka and D. Callies (eds) Taking 
Land: Compulsory Purchase and Regulation in Asian-Pacific Countries (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press) 40. 
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In another example, Clause 36 Schedule 1 Water Management Amendment Act 2005 (NSW), 
amended the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) through the provision of a new section s.87AB 
which provides that compensation is not payable by or on behalf of the Crown in respect to  
"relevant conduct" in relation to a water management plan arising from the following: 
 
(a) any act or omission, whether unconscionable, misleading, deceptive or otherwise. 
(b) a representation of any kind, whether made verbally or in writing and whether negligent, 
false, misleading or otherwise. 
  
Interestingly, the President of the Law Society of NSW wrote to the Minister for Planning and the 
Attorney General in March 2006 regarding s.87AB stating as follows: 
  
The effect of this amendment is to remove people's right to seek compensation for any loss 
they may suffer as a result of the creation of a management plan that reduces their valuable 
water allocation rights under circumstances where the loss arises from any act or omission 
in relation to the content of the plan, its effect or government policy in relation to it, even if 
such act or omission is inter alia unconscionable, deceptive, false or misleading. That is, a 
person is prevented from seeking compensation for a real loss suffered by them even if it 
results from deliberately false and misleading acts or omissions done in bad faith where are 
intended to cause the loss actually suffered. 
  
This is an unconscionable abrogation to the rights of individuals who suffer loss at the 
hands of the state or its agencies to recover compensation in circumstances where it is 
clearly deserved.12 
 
There is significant history detailing the avoidance by the State of NSW for payment of 
compensation, or reduction in compensation arising from compulsory acquisition, and there is little 
to suggest that amendments such as s.87AB will be repealed. Indeed, unwillingness to amend the 
limited compensation provisions of the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) strongly suggests that 
any future compensation for the extinguishment or diminution of native title in water can be 
expected to be scant indeed. Such melancholy observation is unsurprising given that s.100 of the 
Australian Constitution forcefully reminds us of the strength of the States’ water powers: 
 
The Commonwealth shall not, by any law or regulation of trade or commerce, abridge the right 
of a State or of the residents therein to the reasonable use of the waters of rivers for conservation 
or irrigation. 
 
It will be recalled that s.52 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) preserves existing riparian rights 
which can be considered as a compensable interest under the Land Acquisition (Just Terms 
Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW). While other non-Indigenous water rights do not have this 
connection with land, paradoxically native title rights and interests including those residing in 
water, are required by s.223 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) to demonstrate this connection with land in 
order to be recognised.  
Research by Small13 has provided a greater understanding of the notion of non Indigenous property 
rights, and whether certain interests can be construed as “property”.  Such notions have been further 
developed by Sheehan and Small14 in direct application to understand the various facets which can 
                                                 
12 Letter from President, the Law Society of NSW to the Hon Bob Devus MP,  Attorney-General, 29 March 2006. 
13 Small, G  (2001) “Past provides the future key to major contemporary issues” Australian Property Journal 36 (8) 737 
– 741, 749. 
14 Sheehan, J.B. & Small, G. (2002) Towards a Definition of Property Rights Working Paper No 1.02 (Sydney: UTS 
Property Research Unit, Faculty of Design Architecture and Building, University of Technology Sydney) October. 
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comprise the “bundle of rights” present in a specific native title at a specific location. However, it is 
problematic whether some Indigenous rights satisfy s.223, which as stated above recognises only 
those incidents having a nexus with land. 
 
Nevertheless, there is obviously a constellation of rights and interests in Aboriginal law and culture, 
which are not recognised by s.223, however those rights and interests which do meet the test of 
s.223 are not limited to land, and almost certainly embrace water and possibly irreducibly complex. 
The following section of this paper considers the often overlooked issue of groundwater which is 
part of that intricate fusion which is native title in water. 
 
  
INDIGENOUS GROUND WATER  
 
The question of whether ground water is “property” from the non Indigenous standpoint was dealt 
with by Gray, Connolly and Marshall, JJ in their decision in the ACT Court of Appeal in 
Environment Protection Authority v Rashleigh [2005] ACTCA 42 (Rashleigh), stating that: 
 
[t]his provision, ..seems to us to recognise the pre-existing common law right of a 
landowner to access groundwater. The legislature, it seems to us, has clearly evinced an 
intention not to interfere with these rights, even though, in our view, these rights do not 
amount to proprietary rights. To the extent that all landholders require a licence to operate 
a bore to access groundwater, whether or not they require an allocation to use that water, 
that requirement does not amount to an acquisition of property.15 
 
Rashleigh  describes long settled common law, their Honours noting that: 
 
[t]he position is well stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed 2004 reissue) Vol 49 (2): 
Water, at [47]: 
 
Although certain rights as regards flowing water are incident to the ownership of riparian 
property, the water itself, whether flowing in a known and defined channel or percolating 
through the soil, is not, at common law, the subject of property or capable of being granted 
to anybody. Flowing water is only of public right in the sense that it is public or common to 
all who have a right of access to it.16 
 
Further, they observe that the various English authorities which stretch back to 1885: 
 
…have been followed in Australia (Xuerab v Viola (1990) Aust Torts Reports 81-012 per 
Giles J), and establish that, at common law, while any landowner may extract groundwater, 
no landowner has property in that water. It follows that Parliament may intervene to 
regulate, in the public interest, access to that water, without interfering with an interest in 
property. 
 
Moreover, it seems to us that, even if the right to extract water percolating under land is 
anything more than one of the “bundle of rights” that go to make up “property” (Yanner v 
Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351 at 366), the imposition by the Legislative Assembly of a regime 
to regulate access to underground water does not amount to an acquisition of any such 
property.17 
                                                 
15 Environmental Protection Authority v Rashleigh [2005] ACTCA 42 at [36] 
16 Rashleigh  at [11] 
17 Rashleigh  at [15-16] 
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Whilst non Indigenous rights to ground water are not viewed in Rashleigh as “property”, native title 
in groundwater may be regarded as having some of the features of a species of property but not 
necessarily real property.18 Furthermore, s.223 requires that whatever the native title interest might 
be, a connection with land must be evident. Newell concludes that the common law right to ground 
water aside from native title leads to the fact that: 
 
…the indigenous community owns the underlying title to the land means that (provided they 
do not live in South Australia) they possess a common law right to access groundwater 
resources for use as drinking water.19 
 
Whether non Indigenous rights of access to surface water or ground water are “property” remains 
problematic, however in respect of native title in water arguably  the decision in Yarmirr20 decided 




THE YARMIRR DECISION 
 
The 2002 decision in Yarmirr enabled traditional owners to contemplate successfully asserting that 
part of their native title comprises water. Mary Yarmirr, a traditional owner of Croker Island which 
was the area of concern in Yarmirr explained Indigenous water property rights as follows: 
 
My Mandilarri sea country is at the top end of Croker Island. When I use the word 
“country”, I am talking about dry land, fresh water and the sea. And when I talk about sea 
country, I am not talking only about the waters of the sea. 
I am talking about the sea bed and the reefs, and the fish and animals in the sea, and our 
fishing and hunting grounds, and the air and clouds above the sea, and about our sacred 
sites and ancestral beings who created all the country. 
Our ancestors are still there. Our country, both land and sea, belongs to us, and we belong 
to it. For we cannot survive without the land and the sea, for it breathes, controls and gives 
life.21  
 
Clearly, traditional owners of sea rights such as Mary Yarmirr have a holistic view of the extent of 
their rights and interests, a view which is somewhat different to the current Anglo-Australian 
dissection into defined sectoral property rights of previously inchoate rights. There is difficulty for 
non Indigenous persons in understanding how sea country is not only about seawaters, but also 
seabeds, the flora and fauna in the sea, and fishing rights and apparently air rights. In addition, sea 
country has a metaphysical facet which is evidenced in the presence of sacred sites and heroic 
stories about creation beings.  
 
The importance attached to rights to water by traditional societies is evident in other jurisdictions, 
and it is useful to consider the example of pre contact Hawaii, and even other legal traditions such 
as Islamic law.  
 
 
                                                 
18 Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2002) 208 CLR  1 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [12] 
19 Newell, V. (2002) Á common law right to groundwater” in Background Briefing papers (Broome: Lingiari 
Foundation) February, 14. 
20 See at 16. 
21Yarmirr, M,. (2002) “Sea Rights”, Land Rights Queensland (June) 9. 
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TRADITIONAL WATER RIGHTS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
 
According to Hutchins in his classic 1946 treatise on The Hawaiian System of Water Rights: 22 
 
Water supply has long played a very important part in the agricultural, industrial and 
community development of the Hawaiian Islands … 
 
In the earliest historical days of Hawaii all land and water rights were owned and 
controlled personally by the King. Grants of certain land and water rights were made by the 
King, usually on a temporary basis, to various of his chiefs in payment for services, loyalty, 
favors, etc. From time to time, especially upon the occasion of the Mahele, water rights 
were changed or transferred by grants, inheritances and in devious other ways until today 
their ownership presents a somewhat complex pattern peculiar to Hawaii. Such early water 
rights, either those which may have had individual titles or those that were appurtenant to 
land titles, were almost entirely confined to surface waters with little consideration given to 
ground waters.23 
  
Hutchins  further points out that: 
 
…possession of allotted land, though basically temporary and insecure even during the life 
of the holder, carried with it water rights, fishing rights, and the right to use forest products. 
This was essentially a feudal system, although the common people were not serfs tied to the 
soil and might move from the possessions of one chief to those of another; and the system 
was closely interwoven with the government which emanated from the king as absolute 
ruler and extended down through the chiefs and officials of various ranks to the great mass 
of common people.24 
 
It is arguable as to whether these traditional Hawaiian water rights are in fact “property” however it 
is known that during the lifetime of the landholder possession also carried with it water and fishing 
rights, indicating a sophisticated tenurial rights regime covering a number of natural resources.  
 
In a similar vein, Planck observes that Islamic law traditionally recognises the importance of water, 
in that: 
 
…all agrarian reform legislations take into consideration existing water rights and 
traditional water laws25 
                                                 
22 Hutchins, W., (1946) The Hawaiian System of Water Rights. (Honolulu: Board of Water Supply City and County of 
Honolulu, Hawaii). 
23 Hutchins, v. 
24 Hutchins, 22. 
25 Planck, U., (1987) “Issues of Water in Agrarian Reform Legislation of the Near East” Land Reform, Land Settlements 
and Cooperation 1/2 (1987), UNFAO Rome. 59. 
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With the current parlous state of Afghanistan, it is paradoxical Planck reported that in 1978, the 
Afghanistan Revolutionary Council initiated a reform of land and property stating that: 
 
…[l]egal positions in irrigation matters, especially owner’s rights on irrigation water [were 
guaranteed]26 
 
Other Islamic countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, and Iran, have for many years recognised the 
existence of land property and water property, and Planck points out that this situation exists 
because: 
 
[t]he outstanding importance of water is even part of the religious education which culminates in the words of Allah spoken by the prophet 
Mohammed in the Koran “…out of the water we made everything that lives… 
 
All traditional and secular legislation systems concerning the ownership of water sources 
and the utilization of water initiate from these words of the Prophet. Differing 
interpretations by the representatives of different Islamic schools lead to divergent water 
rights. They vary from the fixed combination of water and land property to their complete 
separation. The different ratios of water and land rights do not only depend on regionally 
different customary laws, but also on the different origins of water used for irrigation 
purposes. 27 
 
Clearly, water property rights are regarded as having great value in Islamic law and it is pertinent to 
note that any change in these traditional water rights in Islamic countries would be according to 
Planck: 
 
…a much greater intervention than the confiscation of land, [and] it can be politically 





Long established traditions of access and proprietorship in water whether they are native title 
recognised by the Australian common law, traditional Polynesian law or within a tradition of 
Islamic law, obviously have great value to the holders. These rights cannot and ought not be swept 
away or ignored, and indeed culturally appropriate laws in many countries protect such rights. 
 
The task for the Australian States who have constitutional responsibility for the management of 
water, is to ensure that indigenous water property rights are respected, and if a need arises for their 
diminution or expropriation, that meaningful compensation entitlements are met. 
 
                                                 
26 Planck, 61. 
27 Planck, 74. 
28 Planck, 73. 
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